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R e v u ed el ’ I n s t i t u td uM o n d ee td udéveloppement
The poll linked to the second regional self-government election in 2005 was
characterized as political disillusion; (approximately 18 percent of electo-
rate voted in the first round, however the poll in the second round was only
a little bit more than 11 percent). Empirical data derived from various sur-
veys or political analyses (Klimovský, 2006a; Klimovský, 2007; Mesežnikov,
2006) that were developed before this election supported a hypothesis about
a low degree of citizens’ awareness and interest in the activities of regional
self-government bodies within the period of their first term of office.
As far as public administration system is concerned, the government im-
plemented fiscal decentralization and put into practice some substantial
changes concerning state administration (particularly on its sub-national
levels).
The government decided and parliament consequently approved a huge re-
duction of general state administration in 2003. The most visible part, from
citizens’ point of view, of such reduction was an abolishment of all district
state administration authorities and a re-establishment of borough state
administration authorities. The main idea of this resulted from a govern-
ment effort to reduce general state administration (because of large transfer
of competences from regional or district state administration to regional or
local level of self-government), and vice-versa, to strengthen its specialized
parts. A reduction of civil servants was, as stated by Kling and Pilát (2003)
in the period of years 2002 and 2003, slower than planned and proclaimed
by the government (for example, 770 civil servants should be withdrawn as
per the 1 May 2003 but the term was prolonged as per the 1 July 2003, and
only 382 civil servants were withdrawn in fact).
Fiscal decentralization was not implemented at the same time as decentra-
lization of competences, and because it was implemented later, some se-
rious problems occurred. As it is mentioned by Palúš (2004), especially the
superior territorial units and their bodies were completely dependent on
the state budget. Of course, it interfered with basic principles of division of
political power and responsibility because these units remained dependent
on the central government’s decisions, there was no motivation to utilize
own potential and remove the disconnection between delivering of public
services and tax payment or low responsibility for public dues.
Although fiscal decentralization was expected with big apprehensions pri-
marily from the side of self-government units and their associations, after
a relatively short period their representatives complimented its impact. For
example, Pilát and Valentovič (2006) mentioned, that according the ZMOS’s
internal research, only 11 towns lost due to fiscal decentralization and its
compensation mechanism in 2005. For that reason it was supported by the
ZMOS. However, because of mechanism of fiscal compensation, the repre-
sentatives of biggest towns (for example Banská Bystrica, Nitra, Trnava or
Žilina) were not as satisfied as the smaller communities. As a consequence
o
RIMD–n 4–2013
R e v u ed el ’ I n s t i t u td uM o n d ee td udéveloppement
The poll linked to the second regional self-government election in 2005 was
characterized as political disillusion; (approximately 18 percent of electo-
rate voted in the first round, however the poll in the second round was only
a little bit more than 11 percent). Empirical data derived from various sur-
veys or political analyses (Klimovský, 2006a; Klimovský, 2007; Mesežnikov,
2006) that were developed before this election supported a hypothesis about
a low degree of citizens’ awareness and interest in the activities of regional
self-government bodies within the period of their first term of office.
As far as public administration system is concerned, the government im-
plemented fiscal decentralization and put into practice some substantial
changes concerning state administration (particularly on its sub-national
levels).
The government decided and parliament consequently approved a huge re-
duction of general state administration in 2003. The most visible part, from
citizens’ point of view, of such reduction was an abolishment of all district
state administration authorities and a re-establishment of borough state
administration authorities. The main idea of this resulted from a govern-
ment effort to reduce general state administration (because of large transfer
of competences from regional or district state administration to regional or
local level of self-government), and vice-versa, to strengthen its specialized
parts. A reduction of civil servants was, as stated by Kling and Pilát (2003)
in the period of years 2002 and 2003, slower than planned and proclaimed
by the government (for example, 770 civil servants should be withdrawn as
per the 1 May 2003 but the term was prolonged as per the 1 July 2003, and
only 382 civil servants were withdrawn in fact).
Fiscal decentralization was not implemented at the same time as decentra-
lization of competences, and because it was implemented later, some se-
rious problems occurred. As it is mentioned by Palúš (2004), especially the
superior territorial units and their bodies were completely dependent on
the state budget. Of course, it interfered with basic principles of division of
political power and responsibility because these units remained dependent
on the central government’s decisions, there was no motivation to utilize
own potential and remove the disconnection between delivering of public
services and tax payment or low responsibility for public dues.
Although fiscal decentralization was expected with big apprehensions pri-
marily from the side of self-government units and their associations, after
a relatively short period their representatives complimented its impact. For
example, Pilát and Valentovič (2006) mentioned, that according the ZMOS’s
internal research, only 11 towns lost due to fiscal decentralization and its
compensation mechanism in 2005. For that reason it was supported by the
ZMOS. However, because of mechanism of fiscal compensation, the repre-
sentatives of biggest towns (for example Banská Bystrica, Nitra, Trnava or
Žilina) were not as satisfied as the smaller communities. As a consequence
o
RIMD–n 4–2013
