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128 R e v u ed el ’ I n s t i t u td uM o n d ee td udéveloppement
they attributed more importance to socio-economic problems (Bútorová,
Gyárfášová and Velšic, 1999, pp. 138-139). As they stated further, the fal-
ling standard of living and crumbling social security structures were put at
the top of the list of the country’s socio-economic problems at that time.
The other serious problems according to public opinion were the following:
unemployment, issues related to crime and personal safety, malfunctioning
of the health care system, and problems linked to economy and privatiza-
tion.
In spite of political preferences and other contexts mentioned above, every
member of this ruling coalition declared willingness to start a large-scale
reform of public administration system that would lead to its moderni-
zation and stronger orientation on citizens’ needs. Such declarations were
included in the program proclamation and did have connection with the
SR’s effort to become a full member of the European union.
The government declared to transfer the responsibility linked to public ad-
ministration reform to a Government Commissioner (Plenipotentiary) for
Public Administration Reform, and Viktor Nižňanský, who, at that time,
was the director of economic think-tank M.E.S.A. 10, was consequently
appointed in February 1999. The responsibility was divided among eight
officials (four Deputy Prime Ministers, Minister of the Interior, Minister
of Finances, Head of the Office of Government of the Slovak Republic,
and mentioned Government Commissioner for Public Administration
Reform), which embarrasses the existing situation. The absurdity of this
decision, and the chaos it sowed in the responsibilities of the various actors
was apparent as early as December 1999, when the Slovak Democratic Left
(SDĽ) accused the Government Commissioner for Public Administration
Reform of not having done a sufficient preparation for the reform of public
administration. This party also demanded that a single person be made res-
ponsible for preparation of the reform, and proposed that the entire agenda
be transferred to the Deputy Prime Minister for Legislation (this position
was taken over by a representative of SDĽ) and to the Ministry of the Inte-
rior. But it was soon apparent that SDĽ’s demands flowed from its partisan
interests – this party objected to the extent of decentralization proposed,
the structure of local state administration offices, as well as to the swiftness
of the reform and thus it tried to gain control of the management of the
reform (Kňažko and Nižňanský, 2001, p. 107). Draft Conception of Decen-
tralization and Modernization of Public Administration was approved by
the government on 11 April 2000.
At the same time the government was deciding on an establishment of
regional self-government units and their bodies. Members of government
negotiated the regional division of 8 units and 12 units in June 2000. With
the exception of two ministers from the Party of Hungarian Coalition
(SMK-MKP), all members voted on 12 units scenario. An integral part of
o
RIMD–n 4–2013
they attributed more importance to socio-economic problems (Bútorová,
Gyárfášová and Velšic, 1999, pp. 138-139). As they stated further, the fal-
ling standard of living and crumbling social security structures were put at
the top of the list of the country’s socio-economic problems at that time.
The other serious problems according to public opinion were the following:
unemployment, issues related to crime and personal safety, malfunctioning
of the health care system, and problems linked to economy and privatiza-
tion.
In spite of political preferences and other contexts mentioned above, every
member of this ruling coalition declared willingness to start a large-scale
reform of public administration system that would lead to its moderni-
zation and stronger orientation on citizens’ needs. Such declarations were
included in the program proclamation and did have connection with the
SR’s effort to become a full member of the European union.
The government declared to transfer the responsibility linked to public ad-
ministration reform to a Government Commissioner (Plenipotentiary) for
Public Administration Reform, and Viktor Nižňanský, who, at that time,
was the director of economic think-tank M.E.S.A. 10, was consequently
appointed in February 1999. The responsibility was divided among eight
officials (four Deputy Prime Ministers, Minister of the Interior, Minister
of Finances, Head of the Office of Government of the Slovak Republic,
and mentioned Government Commissioner for Public Administration
Reform), which embarrasses the existing situation. The absurdity of this
decision, and the chaos it sowed in the responsibilities of the various actors
was apparent as early as December 1999, when the Slovak Democratic Left
(SDĽ) accused the Government Commissioner for Public Administration
Reform of not having done a sufficient preparation for the reform of public
administration. This party also demanded that a single person be made res-
ponsible for preparation of the reform, and proposed that the entire agenda
be transferred to the Deputy Prime Minister for Legislation (this position
was taken over by a representative of SDĽ) and to the Ministry of the Inte-
rior. But it was soon apparent that SDĽ’s demands flowed from its partisan
interests – this party objected to the extent of decentralization proposed,
the structure of local state administration offices, as well as to the swiftness
of the reform and thus it tried to gain control of the management of the
reform (Kňažko and Nižňanský, 2001, p. 107). Draft Conception of Decen-
tralization and Modernization of Public Administration was approved by
the government on 11 April 2000.
At the same time the government was deciding on an establishment of
regional self-government units and their bodies. Members of government
negotiated the regional division of 8 units and 12 units in June 2000. With
the exception of two ministers from the Party of Hungarian Coalition
(SMK-MKP), all members voted on 12 units scenario. An integral part of
o
RIMD–n 4–2013
